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It is submitted that this holding may be extended to all
quasi-contractual obligations, and likewise to obligations arising
upon the commission of a tort where such tort gives rise not only
to damage to the person injured, but also to a monetary benefii
to the tort-feasor. Alternative obligations arise--on the one hand
an obligation to pay such damages as the plaintiff has suffered,
and on the other an obligation to pay for such benefits as the defendant has received. If the plaintiff elects to enforce the obligation to make restitution, and proceeds under the statute in question, no violence is done the language of the statute. True there
has been no assent or voluntary assumption of the obligation, but
the whole law of quasi-contract, from the remedial point of view,
depends on the fiction that the defendant has promised to do that
which in justice he ought to do.'
Virginia has found it desirable to extend the scope of the
remedy, until at the present time one may proceed by notice of
motion for judgment in any case, with certain jurisdictional
limitations, where there is a right to maintain an action at law.!
Such provision is a compromise between a system of code pleading, and a system of common law pleading as modified by statutes.
Doubtless we have proponents of each system. If West Virginia
should make this extension the advocates of code procedure will
have full opportunity to develop the merits of the system. If
they prove more satisfactory than the present system the transition
would be much easier than a complete change at one time.'
-DONALD

Nt. HUTTON.

IS AN IcE BusrNEss "AFECTED WITH A
PUB3IC UTITIES PUBLIC INTEREST"? - The plaintiffs were engaged in the manufacture and sale of ice in Oklahoma City pursuant to a license
granted according to the statute of Oklahoma.' The defendant
was about to set up a similar business in the same city without
applying to the Corporation Commission for the required certificate of convenience and necessity.! The plaintiffs sought to enjoin this establishment on the grounds that it is in violation of the
5

WooDw~AR, THE LAw Op QuAsi-CoNTRACxs (1913) c. 19, 20.
:VA. CODE Axx. (1930) § 6046.
SBuRxs, The Code of 1919 (1919) 5 VA. L. REG. (N. S.) 97, 120.
1

=Okla Sesq. Laws 1925, c. 147.

2Ibid, § 2.
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statute. The court affirmed the decision of the District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma which refused the injunction.8 Southwest Utflities Ice Co. v. Liebman.'
Price regulation presents the point at which litigation of
this sort usually arises. While it is true this case arises over the
validity of a statute requiring additional regulation, i. e., the requiring of a certificate of convenience and necessity, still the
reasons underlying the decision are similar to those in the price
regulation cases. In a fairly recent case the Supreme Court of
Arkansas held valid a similar statute.' On the other hand we
find, in some jurisdictions, holdings to the effect that an ice
plant is not a public utility such as may be operated by a municipality.' By analogy they would lend weight to the decision in
the case under discussion.
The fundamental justification for such governmental regulation has been the protection of the public against the evils arising
out of monopolies7 or what have been more accurately termed
businesses "monopolistic in nature".8 The search for a "test" or
rule that will accurately determine just what businesses should
be subjected to such rigid regulation has been rather futile.
Many courts talk about and apply the time-worn test "affected
with a public interest". This, however, is little more than a conclusion of law which requires explanation more than it explains.
Mr. Chief Justice Taft went so far as to divide businesses into
three classes in an effort to solve the problem.9 Neither has proved
satisfactory.
Here we find the court approaching the problem from an
entirely different angle.
Refusing to recognize any dogmatic
rule which will serve as a solution it bases its decision squarely
on the facts of the case. It reasons thus: whether a business may
be so controlled by legislative enactment is a matter to be determined by the economic and social conditions surrounding that
849 F. (2d) 913.

'52 F. (2d) 349 (C. C. A. 10th 1931).
5Cap F. Bourland Ice Co. v. Franklin Utilities Co., 180 Ark. 770, 22 S. W.
(2d) 993, 68 A. L. R. 1018 (1929).
0 State ex rel. Kansas City v. Orear, 277 Mo. 303, 210 S. W. 392 (1919);
State ex rel. Mueller v. Thompson, 149 Wis. 488, 137 N. W. 20 (1912).
Contra: Denton v. Denton Home Ice Co., 18 S. W. (2d) 606 (1929); City
of Tombstone v. Macia, 30 Ariz. 218, 245 Pac. 677 (1926).
7 Wyman, The Law of Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem
(1904) 17 HARv. L. RIv. 156.
OHardman, Public Utilities. I. The Quest for a Concept (1931) 37 W.
VA. L. Q. 250.
° Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 522, 43 S. Ct. 630
(1923).
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business in that particular locality. The court in applying this
realistic approach to the facts of the case in hand found that the
danger of a prejudicial monopoly in the ice business is largely
averted by two prevalent conditions, namely: (1) the ease with
which ice can be, and frequently is shipped long distances and (2)
-the introduction of domestic refrigeration plants. Thus the proteetion sought for is furnished naturally, without the aid of such
a statute." A similar approach was made in another recent
case."
Undoubtedly, there are those who have different ideas as to
the wisdom of invalidating a statute rigidly controlling the manufacture and sale of ice. Still their quarrel here would be with
the conclusion reached by the court, while from a broad viewpoint the judicial approach to a general problem is more significant than a decision in a single case.
-E. GAUJoT BIAS.

TRusTs

-

EXERCISE BY TRusTEE OF POWER TO TERmI[ATE

A r
PERIOD OF GOOD BEHAVIOR BY SPENDTHRIFT. The St.
Louis Union Trust Company was named trustee for Vincent
Kerens under the will of Kerens' father. The trust created was
terminable in two ways: by Vincent's death or by satisfactory
proof to the Trust Company "that he shall of his own free will
and desire have passed five consecutive years of continued
sobriety and good behavior". The Trust Company determined
that Kerens was entitled to the corpus of the trust in 1928, after
his fifth application to have this trust terminated. To insure its
-position it filed a bill for instructions in the Federal District
Court for Eastern Missouri, naming Kerens and his sisters, the
remaindermen under the trust, as nominal defendants. The sisters appealed from the decision of the District Court affirming
the position taken by the Trust Company. The Circuit Court of
Appeals found from the evidence in the case that the Trust Company knew that Kerens had falsely sworn to an affidavit made in
2OSouthwest Utilities Ice Co. v. Liebman, supra n. 4, at 353. " .....
there-is both potential and actual competition in such business to afford
adequate -protection......
With such competition existing in the business,
we seriously doubt that the manufacture of ice is so affected." .....
(as
to warrant such regulation).
"Consumers' Light & Power Co. v. Phipps, 251 Pac. 63 (Okla. 1926).
See also Mr. Justice Stone's dissent in Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273 U. S.
418, 447, 47 S. Ct. 426 (1927).
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